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Redressing Colonial Genocide Under
International Law: The Hereros' Cause
of Action Against Germany
Rachel Andersont
INTRODUCTION
It is widely supposed that the genocidal wars waged by colonial ad-
ministrations against indigenous peoples or nations before 1948 did not
violate rules of international law. Contemporary scholars and commenta-
tors assert that all forms of genocide were first criminalized and made pun-
ishable by the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (U.N. Genocide Convention).' As a result, schol-
ars argue that wars of annihilation2 perpetrated by colonial administrations
were not illegal acts under contemporaneous international law.3 The
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1. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/genocide/htm. Article 2 of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) [k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) [i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) [f]orcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. art. 2.
2. Some scholars and commentators also use the historical term "war of extermination." See
JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE V6LKERRECHT DER CIVILISIRTEN STATEN 299 (1878).
Genocide, the modem term first used by Raphael Lemkin, encompasses several subcategories,
including wars of annihilation or extermination. See RAPHAEL LtMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED
EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION - ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT - PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944).
3. See generally JMT Axel KIimmerer & J6rg F6h, Das Vdlkerrecht als Instrument der
Wiedergutmachung? - Eine kritische Betrachtung am Beiskpiel des Herero-Aufstandes, 42 ARCHIV DES
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German government, modem scholars, and other commentators take this
stance toward the German-Herero War of 1904-07, the first genocidal war
of the twentieth century. 4 However, the German government, these schol-
ars, and commentators fail to recognize that by the end of the nineteenth
century, specific forms of genocide were already illegal under customary
international law and multilateral treaties.5 This Comment argues that in-
ternational treaty law and customary international law contemporaneous to
the German-Herero War reveal that: (1) international law banned colonial
acts of annihilation in Africa, and (2) this law was directly applicable to
the German-Herero War. In consequence, the Hereros' case for moral and
even legal redress is stronger than heretofore assumed.
The Hereros, a minority ethnic group in Namibia,6 are seeking politi-
cal and legal redress from the German government and corporations in-
volved in the German colonial enterprise. They received an apology from
the German government in 2004.' However, the Federal Republic has not
acknowledged any legal obligations, and the Hereros have not received any
financial compensation. The Hereros are currently pursuing claims in U.S.
courts against Deutsche Bank and Woermann Line (now Deutsche
Afrika-Linien Gmbh & Co.).8 The Hereros are suing Deutsche Bank based
on its financing of the German colonial administration and participation in
the German colonial enterprise.9 The Hereros have included Woermann
VOLKERRECHTs 294 (2004) (arguing that the German colonial war of annihilation against the Herero
people was not a violation of contemporaneous international law).
4. See HORST DRECHSLER, LET Us DIE FIGHTING: THE STRUGGLE OF THE HERERO AND NAMA
AGAINST GERMAN IMPERIALISM (1884-1915), at 7 (Bernd Zollner transl., 1980) ("The war against the
Hereto and Nama was the first in which [the] German [colonial administration] resorted to methods of
genocide .. "); Leona Toker, One [H]undred [Years of [E]vil, Haaretz.com, Apr. 15, 2005, at
http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/565268.html (This was the "first genocide of the [twentieth]
century."). The German-Herero war has been described by Dan Stone as "[o]ne of the most horrific[]
and still comparatively unknown" genocides. Dan Stone, White [Men with [Liow [Mioral
[Sitandards? German [A]nthropology and the Herero [G]enocide, 35 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 33
(2001). See also Sidney L. Harring, German Reparations to the Herero Nation: An Assertion of Herero
Nationhood in the Path of Namibian Development, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 393 (2002) ("The war,
although not well known in a world of far more deadly wars, was among the twentieth century's
bloodiest colonial wars ... ").
5. See, e.g., Kdrmmerer & Foh, supra note 3.
6. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Namibia, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wa.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2005). The Hereros
make up 7% of the Namibian population. Id.
7. See German Parliament, In [C]ommemoration of the [V]ictims of the Colonial War in the
[F]ormer German-South West Africa, 15th Legislative Period, June 16, 2004, available at
www.windhuk.diplo.de/de/seite-erklaerungBT_160604.htm [hereinafter German
Parliament].
8. Complaint, Hereto People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
13, 2003) (on file with author) (alleging violations of international law, crimes against humanity,
genocide, slavery, and forced labor).
9. See id. 1 4 (alleging direct responsibility for and commission of crimes against humanity
perpetrated against the Hereros).
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Line in the suit because it "employed slave labor and
operated [a] concentration camp."'
The Hereros' efforts have not been supported by the Namibian gov-
ernment, which has received more than five hundred million Euros in de-
velopment aid since winning independence in 1990.11 The German
government is Namibia's main donor country and acknowledges that it
owes this aid as a "special responsibility" in light of its past colonization of
Namibia.12 The Hereros benefit only marginally from this aid;13 however,
substantial recovery through litigation could help them achieve financial
independence. As momentum for their claim builds, the Hereros have re-
ceived increasing press coverage.1 4
Some of the discourse analyzing the legality of the atrocities the
Germans committed against the Hereros examines the relationship arising
from the bilateral protection treaties between the German Reich, which
pursued a colonial enterprise in Hereroland from 1884 to 1919, and the
Hereros, who numbered 80,000 prior to the war. 5 However, this discourse
is incomplete because it does not address the illegality of some forms of
genocide under customary international law and multilateral treaties. This
limited discussion of international legal prohibitions against certain forms
10. Id. 6 (alleging direct responsibility for and commission of crimes against humanity
perpetrated against the Hereros).
11. German Federal Foreign Office, Namibia: Relations Between Namibia and Germany, at
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender-ausgabe-html?land id=l 18
(last modified Jan. 2005).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Peace Pledge Union, Genocide - Namibia, at http://www.ppu.org.uk/
genocide/gnamibia2.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
14. See Deutsche Welle Staff, Germany Urges Herero to Drop Lawsuit, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Aug.
5, 2004, at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1287663,00.html; Ben Kieman, Less Talk, More
Action, Scotland on Sunday, Mar. 20, 2005, at http://news.scotsman.com/opinion.cfm?id=299422005;
Petros Kuteeue, Namibia: No [A]pology, [Nbo [P]ayout for Herero, THE NAMIBIAN, Jan. 12, 2004,
http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/4613.html; Andrew Matjila, Everyone Should Back Herero Reparations,
THE NAMIBIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, at http://www.namibian.com.na/2004/march/letters/042BCB67EF.html;
Philip Ngunjiri, Germany Refuses to Apologize for Herero Holocaust, Black Voices, Oct. 14, 2002, at
http://archive.blackvoices.com/articles/daily/index_20021014.asp.
15. See, e.g., Manfred 0. Hinz, One Hundred Years Later: Germany on Trial in the USA-The
Herero Reparations Claim for Genocide, 1 NAMIBIAN HUMAN RTS. ON-LINE J. (2003), at
http://www.hrdc.unam.na/journal/VlNIDec2003/index.htm; Kammerer & Foh, supra note 3. The
Herero Nation entered into bilateral protection treaties with Germany in 1885 and 1890. HELMUT
BLEY, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1894-1914, at 6 (1971) (citation omitted). These
treaties were limited in scope. See DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 27 ("The Chief, as one party to the
treaty, undertook not to enter into any treaties with other nations and not to cede his territory or
portions thereof to any other nation or members thereof without the approval of the German
[g]ovemment. He also pledged to protect the life and property of German nationals and to allow them
to carry on trade without let or hindrance on his territory, the German authorities retaining jurisdiction
over all Europeans. In return, the German [g]ovemment promised to extend "protection" to the chief
and his tribe, while recognizing and supporting the [c]hief's jurisdiction over his own people.
Europeans were to respect the customs and traditions of the Africans and to abstain from any act that
would be an infraction of laws and regulations in force in their own country.").
2005] 1157
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1157 2005
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
of genocide at the turn of the twentieth century has constrained the
Hereros' ongoing claims against the German government and German
enterprises for reparations.
International legal prohibitions against some forms of genocide, such
as wars of annihilation, developed long before their codification in the
U.N. Genocide Convention and were embedded in both treaty and custom-
ary law by the late nineteenth century. An analysis of international law dur-
ing the early twentieth century shows that the war of annihilation waged by
the German colonial administration against the Herero Nation violated sev-
eral treaties to which Germany was a signatory, as well as the customary
law of the period. Most scholars do not dispute that Germany waged a war
of annihilation against the Hereros. 16 There is ample evidence that the
Hereros endured slavery, forced labor, concentration camps, medical
experimentation, destruction of tribal culture and social organizations, and
systematic abuse of women and children.' 7 Nonetheless, commentators and
scholars have argued that because these acts were not illegal at the time
they were perpetrated, Germany has no legal obligation to the Hereros. 18
In contrast, this Comment argues that documents from the 1884 Berlin
Conference, the 1890 Anti-Slavery Conference in Brussels, and the 1899
Hague Conference on the Laws of War support the Hereros' claim for
reparations against the German government and associated German enter-
prises. The 1885 Berlin West Africa Convention provides an additional
avenue for redress under the third-party beneficiary doctrine. The writings
of contemporaneous scholars also indicate that European powers had legal
duties and obligations to indigenous African peoples under customary laws
of the period.
Part I of this Comment outlines German colonial policies in
Hereroland (also known as South West Africa, today Namibia) and re-
counts Germany's systematic annihilation of the indigenous Herero popu-
lation. Part II establishes the illegality of wars of annihilation under
international law as it already stood by the end of the nineteenth century.
Part III places Germany's war of annihilation against the Hereros' 9
squarely within that contemporaneous jurisprudence. Part IV explains how
16. The Herero genocide has been featured in exhibits around the world, including ones at the
Genocide Memorial in Kigali and the recently reopened Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious
Minorities in Oslo. See Robert Walker, Rwanda Remembers the Holocaust, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4211621.stm (last modified Jan. 27, 2005); Norwegian Nazi Leader's
Villa Converted into a Holocaust Museum, CAPE TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004,
http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=272&fArticleld=2357418 [hereinafter CAPE TIMES].
17. See Harring supra note 4, at 401. For a detailed account of the German-Herero War and its
effects on the Herero Nation see, e.g., DRECHSLER, supra note 4; JAN-BART GEWALD, HERtRO
HEROES: A SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF NAMIBIA 189o-1923 (1999).
18. See generally K~mmerer & Fth, supra note 3 (arguing that the German colonial war of
annihilation against the Herero people was not a violation of contemporaneous international law).
19. The Hereros' status as a nation is discussed infra.
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the third-party beneficiary doctrine provides the Hereros with a claim
against Germany. Part V identifies some implications of the analysis in this
Comment, including the possible impact of the Hereros' cause of action
upon other groups seeking redress for similar wrongs committed under co-
lonial rule.
I
THE GERMAN COLONIAL WAR OF ANNIHILATION AGAINST THE HERERO
NATION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Hereros numbered ap-
proximately 80,00020 in Hereroland (also known as South West Africa,
today Namibia), where the German colonial enterprise2 lasted from 1884
to 1919.2 The German merchant Adolf Lideritz purchased the harbor of
Angra Pequena and its surrounding lands, located on the southern coast of
present-day Namibia, in 1883 and began calling for German protection.23
The following year, Germany declared Lideritz's land a protectorate. 24 The
Herero Nation, seeking military support in conflicts with the Nama, an-
other indigenous nation in the region, entered into a treaty of friendship
and protection 25 with the German government in 1885.26 The Herero Nation
20. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 214 (citation omitted); BLEY, supra note 15, at 150.
21. Because Germany became a unified nation much later than other European countries, it
pursued colonial interests to procure a "place in the sun" with other world powers. At the session of the
German Parliament on Dec. 6, 1897, Imperial Chancellor von Billow described Germany's right to
colonial territories in the context of a "desire for [Germany's] place in the sun" ("das Verlangen nach
unserem Platz in der Sonne"), a phrase that is still famous today. Paulette Reed-Anderson, "Ein Platz
an der afrikanischen Sonne"--Deutsche Hegemonie auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent, at
http://www.cybemomads.net/cn/home.cfm?p=995# (last visited Apr. 13, 2005) (citation omitted). This
phrase symbolizes the intent to achieve domination over the Africans and to conquer and rule their
lands. See id.
22. See Sam Nujoma, Preface, in DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at VII.
23. See ISRAEL GOLDBLATT, HISTORY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 81 (1971); Lynn Berat, Genocide: The Namibian Case Against Germany, 5
PACE INT'L L. REV. 165, 174 (1993). This fateful event led to the establishment of the first German
colony in Africa. See Harring, supra note 4, at 398.
24. See Walfish Bay & St. John's River Territories Annexation Act, No. 35 (1884); Berat, supra
note 23, at 174 (citing Proc. No. 184 (1884), CAPE OF GOOD HOPE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, Aug. 8,
1884, at 408); id. at 175 (citing 2 EDWARD HERTSLET, THE MAP OF AFRICA BY TREATY 693 (1909)); id.
(citing Agreement, reprinted in 2 MICHAEL HURST, KEY TREATIES FOR THE GREAT POWERS, 1814-
1914, at 873 (1972)); see also JAN HENDRIK ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1880-1894: THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF GERMAN AUTHORITY IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 46-65 (1968).
25. Trait6 de protection et d'amiti6 entre l'Allemange et Maharero Katyamuaha Chef suprbme
des Hereros, Oct. 21, 1885, F.R.G.-Hereroland, 165 Consol. T.S. 14 (German); Treaty of Protection
and Friendship with the Hereros, Oct. 21, 1885, F.R.G.-Hereroland, 165 Consol. T.S. 20 (English).
26. See generally Hinz, supra note 15, at 8 (citing Schutz- und Freundschafisvertrag zwischen
dem Deutschen Reich und den Herero, in JAKOB IRLE, DIE HERERO: EIN BEITRAG ZUR LANDES-,
VOLKS- UND MISSIONSKUNDE (1906)). See also Harring, supra note 4, at 398 (citation omitted). Some
modem analyses of the Herero legal claims focus on the relationship between the Herero Nation and
the German government stemming from this treaty. See generally Hinz, supra note 15, at 8; Kfimmerer
& F6h, supra note 3. This protectorate relationship supports the application of international law to the
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withdrew from the treaty when the Germans were unable to provide the
expected military assistance." The treaty was later revived and a further
peace agreement was concluded in 1894, but the German colonial admini-
stration did not "exercise sovereignty over the territory as it was interna-
tionally demarcated"2 8 until 1907.29 Nonetheless, Germany retained power
in South West Africa until 1919, when it lost its colonies as a result of
World War L30 This Part details the German colonial administration's war
of annihilation against the Hereros at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury and establishes that this conduct constituted a form of genocide.
A. Beginning of the German-Herero War
In 1904 Germany began a war of annihilation against the Hereros in
retaliation for the Hereros' resistance against the German colonial admini-
stration's oppressive treatment.3 The German-Herero War was one of the
world's bloodiest conflicts occurring between 1815 and 1914.32 From the
beginning of the war, many Germans supported the total annihilation of the
Hereros. Two days after the Hereros began resisting the colonial admini-
stration, the German Colonial League's Executive Committee released a
pamphlet calling for a swift and harsh response.33 A letter written by a
German missionary to his colleagues captures the violent sentiment among
Germans in Hereroland supporting the annihilation of the Hereros:
Hereros' claims. See Hinz, supra note 15, at 8 ("The more appropriate interpretation of the German
Herero relationship around the German Herero war is to see it as a relationship governed by
international law.") (citing FRIEDRICH SCHACK, DAS DEUTSCHE KOLONIALRECHT IN SEINER
ENTWICKLUNG BIS ZUM WELTKRIEGE. DIE ALLGEMEINEN LEHREN 343 (1923) ("Die zu den Stsmmen
in Sudwestafrika zunachst vorhanden gewesenen Protektoratsbeziehungen des Reiches waren in
Ubereinstimmung mit unseren fr~theren theoretischen Ausfiihrungen hinsichtlich der Protektorate tiber
Stamme zunachst rein volkerrechtliche.") ("The protectorate relationships that existed at that time
between the empire and the tribes in South West Africa were initially purely based on international law
which is in line with (or agreement with) our earlier theoretical remarks with respect to the
protectorate.") (author's transl.)).
27. See Hinz, supra note 15, at 8. This withdrawal also declared void the mineral rights that had
been granted to the Germans. GOLDBLATT, supra note 23, at 109.
28. Hinz, supra note 15, at 8.
29. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 7.
30. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 119, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 255.
31. See Berat, supra note 23, at 177.
32. JON BRIDGMAN, THE REVOLT OF THE HEREROS 1-2 (1981) ("Though casualty figures are
notoriously inaccurate, the total dead was probably greater than in the Boer War, the Crimean War, the
Spanish American War, the Seven Weeks War, and a dozen or more other conflicts that were fought
between 1815 and 1914.").
33. According to the pamphlet, "Anyone familiar with the life of African and other less civilized
non-white peoples knows that Europeans can assert themselves only by maintaining the supremacy of
their race at all costs.... [T]he swifter and harsher the reprisals taken against rebels, the better the
chances of restoring authority." DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 142 (quoting Flugbltter des Deutschen
Kolonial-Bundes, IX: "Zu den Unruhen in Deutsch-Sbdwestafrika," collected in The Herero Uprising
in 1904, Vols. 1-9 (1904-1909), Imp. Col. Off. File Nos. 2111-19, in Imperial Colonial Office File
[hereinafter Imp. Col. Off.] No. 2111, at 26 (on file at the Bundesarchiv Berlin)) [hereinafter The
Herero Uprising]; see also Berat, supra note 23, at 177-78.
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The Germans are consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terrible
thirst for revenge, one might even say they are thirsting for the
blood of the Herero[s]. All you hear these days is "make a clean
sweep, hang them, shoot them to the last man, give no quarter." I
shudder to think what may happen in the months ahead. The
Germans will doubtless exact a grim vengeance.34
Some German politicians did oppose the policy of annihilation. In
March 1904 August Bebel, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, ob-
jected in the German parliament to German troops' barbarous treatment of
the Hereros.35 Likewise, Theodor Leutwein, the German governor of South
West Africa, criticized the annihilation on economic grounds, arguing that
Herero laborers were necessary for the success of the colonial enterprise.36
In April 1904, three months after the war began, the German Emperor
Wilhelm II appointed Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha as com-
mander-in-chief of the German forces in South West Africa.37 Von Trotha
had already become well known for his brutal suppression of indigenous
resistance efforts in the 1896 East African Wahehe Rebellion and the 1900-
1901 Boxer Rebellion in China.38 By November 1904 von Trotha had in-
formed Governor Leutwein that "[h]is Majesty the Emperor only said that
he expected me to crush the rebellion by fair means or foul,"39 and that "[i]t
was and remains my policy to apply this force by unmitigated terrorism
and even cruelty. I shall destroy the rebellious tribes by shedding rivers of
blood and money. '
B. The Extermination Order
Von Trotha promptly translated his intention to destroy the Hereros
into official policy. On October 2, 1904, von Trotha issued an annihilation
order stipulating:
The Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise, I
shall force them to do so by means of guns .... [E]very Herero,
whether found armed or unarmed.. . will be shot. I shall not accept
34. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 145 (citing Letter from Missionary Elger to the Rhenish
Missionary Society (Feb. 10, 1904), collected in The Herero Uprising, supra note 18, in Imp. Col. Off.
File No. 2114, at 80-82); see also Berat, supra note 23, at 178.
35. See DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 151; Berat, supra note 23, at 178.
36. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 148 (citing Letter from Theodor Leutwein to the Colonial
Department (Feb. 23, 1904), collected in The Herero Uprising, supra note 18, in Imp. Col. Off. File No.
2113, at 89-90); see also Berat, supra note 23, at 179.
37. See Berat, supra note 23, at 179.
38. See DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 153; Berat, supra note 23, at 179.
39. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 153-54 (quoting Letter from Lothar von Trotha to Theodor
Leutwein (Nov. 5, 1904), collected in Differences Between Lieutenant-General von Trotha and
Governor Leutwein over Uprisings in German South West Africa during 1904, in Imp. Col. Off. File
No. 2089, at 100-2 (on file at the Bundesarchiv Berlin)) [hereinafter Differences Between von Trotha
and Leutwein]; see also Berat, supra note 23, at 180.
40. DRESCHLER, supra note 4, at 154.
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any more women and children. I shall drive them back to their
people-otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are
my words to the Herero people."
An official report sent two days later by von Trotha to the chief of the army
general staff underlined the intent of the extermination order:
The crucial question for me was how to bring the war against the
Herero [Nation] to a close.... As I see it, the nation must be
destroyed as such .... I ordered the warriors... to be
court-martialled and hanged42 and all women and children who
sought shelter here to be driven back into the sandveld [the
Kalahari Desert] .... To accept women and children who are for
the most part sick, poses a grave risk to the force, and to feed them
is out of the question. For this reason, I deem it wiser for the entire
nation to perish .... This uprising is and remains the beginning of
a racial struggle . . .4
The day after the Germans announced the extermination order, they forced
thirty Herero prisoners, including women and children, to watch the hang-
ing of the Hereros who had been sentenced to death.' The German offi-
cials read the extermination order to the prisoners, handed out printed
copies, and drove them into the Kalahari Desert.4" The hangings marked
the beginning of the German efforts, led by von Trotha, to destroy the
Hereros.
Von Trotha's correspondence confirms that the German-Herero War
was a war of annihilation expressly intended to wipe out the Hereros. In a
letter to Governor Leutwein on October 27, 1904, he wrote, "That [Herero]
nation must vanish from the face of the earth. ''46 Governor Leutwein
responded to this letter by requesting permission from the German Foreign
Office to allow the Hereros to surrender,47 writing that "[a]ccording to
reliable sources, a number of Herero[s] have offered to submit."'48 The writ-
ings of von Trotha's subordinate officers in Hereroland also provide
41. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 156-57 (quoting VORWARTS, No. 294, Dec. 16, 1905); see also
GEWALD, supra note 17, at 172-73.
42. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 160-61 (citation omitted).
43. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 160-61 (quoting Report from Lothar von Trotha to the army
chief of staff (Oct. 4, 1904), collected in Differences Between von Troth and Leutwein, supra note 24),
in Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2089, at 5-6 [hereinafter Report from von Trotha to army chief of staff].
44. See GEWALD, supra note 17, at 173.
45. See WALTER NUHN, STURM 0BER SuOwEST 282 (1989); KONRAD RUST, KRIEG UND
FRIEDEN IM HEREROLANDE 386 (1905).
46. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 161 (quoting Letter from Lothar von Trotha to Governor
Theodor Leutwein (Oct. 27, 1904), collected in Differences Between von Trotha and Leutwein, supra
note 24, in Imp. Off. File No. 2089, at 29).
47. See Berat, supra note 23, at 182.
48. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 161 (quoting Letter from Lothar von Trotha to the general staff
(Oct. 28, 1904), collected in Differences Between von Trotha and Leutwein, supra note 24, in Imp. Off.
File No. 2089, at 103 [hereinafter Letter from von Trotha to Leutwein.]. Von Trotha quotes Leutwein in
this letter.).
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evidence of von Trotha's intent to annihilate the Hereros. In September
1904 Major Ludwig von Estorff wrote:
I followed their [tracks] and found numerous wells which
presented a terrifying sight.... The Herero[s] fled ahead of us into
the [Kalahari]. Again and again this terrible scene kept repeating
itself. With feverish energy the men had worked at opening the
wells, however the water became ever sparser, and wells evermore
rare. They fled from one well to the next and lost virtually all their
cattle and a large number of their people. The people shrunk into
small remnants .... It was a policy which was equally gruesome as
senseless, to hammer the people so much[.]... [T]hey had been
punished enough. I suggested this to General von Trotha but he
wanted their total extermination.49
In November 1904 the Foreign Office recalled Leutwein to Germany,
and Lothar von Trotha replaced him as governor of South West Africa.5
Although Leutwein's recall quieted his criticism of von Trotha's tactics,
opposition to von Trotha's extermination policy increased. Missionaries,
members of the Colonial Department, and others criticized von Trotha's
plan.51 Imperial Chancellor Bernhard von Billow52 wrote to Emperor
Wilhelm II requesting permission to revoke von Trotha's Extermination
Order. The request stated four reasons: (1) inconsistency of the plan to
annihilate the Hereros with Christianity and humanity, (2) impossibility
of success, (3) economic detriment to the colonial enterprise by depriving
it of its "productive forces," and (4) establishment of a policy that was
"demeaning to [Germany's] standing among the civilized nations of the
world."53
On December 8, 1904, the Emperor rescinded the Extermination
Order. 4 However, the decision was narrowly tailored and did not prohibit
future genocidal acts. Instead it only required that "mercy" be included
among the colonial administration's possible policy options.5 The general'
staff wrote, "His Majesty has not forbidden you to fire on the
49. GEWALD, supra note 17, at 174 (citing Namibian National Archives Windhoek, Acc. 109, 49
(Gewald transi.)).
50. BLEY, supra note 15, at 159.
51. See id. at 164-65.
52. The imperial chancellor was the head of the German government, the emperor's first
minister, and the presiding officer of the upper chamber of the German Parliament. See Wikipedia: The
Free Encyclopedia, Chancellor of Germany, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German chancellor (last
modified Feb. 10, 2005).
53. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 163-64 (quoting Letter from Imperial Chancellor Bernhard von
Billow to Emperor Wilhelm II (Nov. 24, 1904), collected in Differences Between von Trotha and
Leutwein, supra note 24), in Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2089, at 8-11).
54. See BLEY, supra note 15, at 167.
55. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 164 (quoting Letter from general staff to von Trotha (Dec. 12,
1904), collected in Differences Between von Trotha and Leutwein, supra note 24, in Imp. Col. Off. File
No. 2089, at 85).
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Herero[s].... But the possibility of showing mercy, ruled out by the
proclamation of 2 October [the Extermination Order], is ... to be restored
again. 56 In addition, the rescission of the Order did not officially disap-
prove of von Trotha or his tactics. Indeed, the following year Emperor
Wilhelm II awarded von Trotha a medal of honor for his work in South
West Africa.57
C. Slave Labor and Concentration Camps
Even after the Emperor rescinded the Extermination Order, the
German colonial administration continued to decimate the Hereros by forc-
ing Herero prisoners of war into slave-labor and concentration camps. 8
The German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Bilow, ordered the creation
of concentration camps in Hereroland in 1904."9 By late May 1905 the
Germans had taken 8,040 Herero prisoners of war, of whom more than
three-quarters were women and children.6" The Germans immediately
shipped the prisoners to slave-labor camps, where they worked under gru-
eling conditions6' and were subjected to medical experiments. 6' The
56. Id. Von Trotha was never happy with this decision and lobbied for its reversal until he left for
Germany in November 1905. See BLEY, supra note 15, at 167.
57. See BLEY, supra note 15, at 165, 169.
58. See generally Joachim Zeller, "Wie Vieh wurden hunderte zu Tode getrieben und wie Vieh
begraben ": Fotodokumente aus dem deutschen Konzentrationslager in Swakopmund/Namibia 1904-
1908, 49 ZEITSCHR1F" FUR GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT 226 (2001) (discussing the concentration camps
established and run by the German colonial enterprise and including eleven photographs from this
period from the National Archives of Windhoek, the Stadtarchiv Ntsmberg, Frankfurter Stadt- und
Universitatsbibliothek, which has a collection of more than 55,000 pictures from the former Deutschen
Kolonialgesellschaft and the Reichskolonialbundes, some of which are available online at Der
Bildbestand der Deutschen Kolonialgesellschaft in der Stadt- und Universitatsbibliothek Frankfurt am
Main, at http://www.stub.bildarchiv-dkg.uni-frankfurt.de (last visited Apr. 16, 2005)); see also
DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 207. The parallels between these concentration camps and those used by
the Nazis during the Holocaust are unmistakable, and the genocides committed by the German colonial
administration in Africa were the predecessors of and served as models for the Holocaust. Scholars
such as Professor Edward Kissi, a leading expert on genocide, argue that "[tihe road to the Holocaust
went through Africa" because research during the 1920s by German anthropologists studying theories
of racial purification in Africa was used to justify the Nazis' belief in eugenics. Matthew Pleasant,
From Africa to Auschwitz, ORACLE, Jan. 11, 2005, available at http://www.usforacle.com/
vnews/display.v/ART/2005/01/11/41e3dfd9ee797. See Harring, supra note 4, at 396-97 ("Indeed, there
is evidence that the virulent racism that promoted the [H]olocaust not only characterized German
colonization of Africa, but was also partially formed there: (citation omitted) the Germans began
experiments with sterilization in the name of the science of eugenics, the creation of a '[]master race,'
in German South West Africa at the turn of the century."). This racism was also passed down from
father to son; racism against African people to racism against Jewish people. See Hanchard, supra note
62 ("Rudolph Goering, the governor general of German South West Africa at the time, was the father
of Herman Goering, Hitler's second-in-command under the Third Reich.").
59. See Zeller, supra note 58, at 226 (citation omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. According to one account, conditions within the camps were brutal:
[Prisoners of war] were placed behind double rows of barbed wire fencing.... and housed in
pathetic [jammerlichen] structures constructed out of simple sacking and planks, in such a
manner that in one structure 30 to 50 people were forced to stay without distinction as to age
1164
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mortality rate was extremely high: more than 12% of the Hereros serving
as slave labor for railroad construction died in a period of six weeks.63 The
Germans killed all Hereros who tried to escape the inhuman conditions in
the camps immediately and without mercy.64
The brutal living and working conditions in the camps constituted a
policy decision on the part of Germany.65 Vice Governor Hans
Tecklenburg commented on the high mortality rate in the camps in a letter
to the Colonial Department stating, "[t]he more the Herero people
experience personally the consequences of the rebellion, the less will be
their desire-and that of generations to come-to stage another
uprising.... [T]he ordeal they are now undergoing is bound to have a
more lasting effect. 66
and sex. From early morning until late at night, on weekdays as well as on Sundays and
holidays, they had to work under the clubs of raw overseers... until they broke
down.... Like cattle, hundreds were driven to death and like cattle they were buried.
Jan-Bart Gewald, The Road of the Man Called Love and the Sack of Sero: The Herero-German War
and the Export of Herero Labour to the South African Rand, 40 J. AFt. H. 21, 27-28 (1999) (citation
omitted); Zeller, supra note 58, at 227 (citation omitted). In Windhoek, the capital of the territory, a
separate camp was created in which Herero women were kept specifically for the sexual gratification of
German troops. Id. at 28.
62. See Harring, supra note 4, at 396-97 ("Herero prisoners of war were the subject of these
experiments."); Michael G. Hanchard, Herero and Nama Rebellions, 1904-1907: A [P/relude to the
[Modern [H/olocaust?, in A Political Atlas of the African Diaspora, at
http://diaspora.northwestem.edu/mbin/WebObjects/DiasporaX.woa/wa/displayArticie?atomid=619
(last visited Apr. 11, 2005) ("[Clamp prisoners were transformed into human subjects for various
laboratory experiments designed to confirm the racial inferiority of black peoples. These experiments
were overseen by Dr.[] Eugen Fischer who became the senior geneticist of the Nazi regime."); Toker,
supra note 4, ("[M]edical experiments were also conducted there by (literally) the teachers of Josef
Mengele, the Auschwitz "Angel of Death" [forty] years later."). Fischer's work influenced Nazi
physicians and German medical experiments in concentration camps. Ngunjiri, supra note 14. Fischer's
book on his research in Namibia, The Principles of Human Heredity and Race Hygiene, "went on to
become one of Hitler's favorite reads." Id. He later became chancellor of the University of Berlin, and
one of his prominent students was Josef Mengele, "the notorious doctor who performed genetic
experiments on Jewish children at the Auschwitz concentration camp." Id.
63. See Drechsler, supra note 23, at 207 (citing letter to Hans Tecklenburg to the Colonial
Department (July 3, 1905) (on file with German Imp. Col. Off.)) [hereinafter Tecklenburg 1).
64. Id.
65. Compare Gunter Spraul, Der "V6lkermord" and den Herero: Untersuchungen zu einer
neuen Kontinuitdtsthese, 39 GESCHICHTE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND UNTERRICHT 713 (1988) ("Hier [in
deutschen Sild-westafrika] seien die ersten KZ [Konzentrtionslagem] errichtet und dreip3ig Jahre vor
Hitler "deutsches Herrenmenschentum" praktiziert worden. Damit habe die deutsche Kolonialpolitik in
Zeilsetzung und Methoden das Dritte Reich vorweggenommen." (citation omitted)) ("Here [in German
South West Africa] the first concentration camps were set up, and 30 years before Hitler the cult of the
German master race was practiced.") (author's transl.), with Toker, supra note 4, ("Concentration
camps were neither a Russian invention nor a German one. They were first established in 1896 by
Spaniards in Cuba .... The German colonial powers... contributed to the history of the concentration
camp by introducing the idea of forced labor ... ").
66. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 207 (quoting Letter from Hans Tecklenburg to the Colonial
Department (July 3, 1905), collected in The Herero Uprising, supra note 19, in Imp. Col. Off. File
2118, at 153-54).
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The brutality against the Hereros continued as Friedrich von
Lindequist succeeded von Trotha as governor of South West Africa.67
Under von Lindequist, German military hostilities ceased briefly from
December 1905 until mid-1906. 68 Despite the pause in military strikes, von
Lindequist established concentration camps in December 1905 for Hereros
who had surrendered to Germans. 69 By May 1906, the Germans had cap-
tured 14,769 Hereros: 4,137 men, 5,989 women, and 4,643 children. 7 Two
months later, von Lindequist wrote to the Colonial Department that "[t]he
northern and central parts of the country, in particular Hereroland proper,
are virtually devoid of Herero[s].... Those still roaming about will
consider themselves lucky if they come to no harm. 71
The German's annihilation campaign was brutal and successful. When
the Germans did not shoot or hang Herero prisoners of war, they drove
them into the desert. 72 The Germans tattooed survivors "GH, Gefangene
Herero (imprisoned Herero[s])"73 and forced them into slave-labor and
concentration camps.7" By the end of the war in 1907, "the Herero people
as such was annihilated."75 In just a few years, the Germans killed more
than 65,000 of the 80,000 Hereros:76 they slaughtered them in battle, poi-
soned them, tortured them to death, trapped them in their huts and burned
them to death, and drove them into the Kalahari Desert to die of hunger
and thirst.77 As the following Part illustrates, Germany's massacre of the
Hereros differs from many other atrocities perpetrated by European colo-
nizers against indigenous Africans because its express purpose was annihi-
lation.
67. Berat, supra note 23, at 183.
68. Id. at 183-84.
69. Id. at 184. See also Jeremy Sarkin, Reparation for Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts
Around the World, Especially the United States, to Pursue African Human Rights Claims, 32 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 426 (2004) (The German colonial administration's policy included the "establishment of
concentration camps in which more than half the prisoners died."); Jan-Bart Gewald, supra note 61, at
21, 27-28. The camps were finally abolished in April 1908. Id. at 29.
70. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 208.
71. Id. (quoting Letter from Friedrich von Lindequist to the Colonial Department (July 24, 1906),
collected in The Herero Uprising, supra note 19, in Imp. Col. Off. File No. 2119, at 46, published in 17
DEUTSCHES KOLONIALBLATT 641 (1906)).
72. See GEWALD, supra note 17, at 173; Nuhn, supra note 45, at 282; RuST, supra note 45, at
386.
73. Stone, supra note 4, at 34.
74. See Letter to the general staff, supra note 60; DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 207; Gewald,
supra note 61, at 27-28.
75. See WILHELM KLZ, DEUTSCH-SUDAFRIKA IM 25. JAHRE DEUTSCHER
SCHUTZHERRSCHAFT: SKIZZEN UND BEITRXGE ZUR GESCHICHTE DEUTSCHi-SDAFRIKA 159 (1909).
76. See id.; DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 214 (discussing the results of the 1911 census); Harring,
supra note 4, at 401 ("The census of 1911 gives the Herero population in South West Africa as 15,130,
down from about 80,000 before the war.").
77. Harring, supra note 4, at 400 ("The Herero[s], including women and children, died after
being driven out into the Kalahari and denied access to water holes.").
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II
WARS OF ANNIHILATION AS VIOLATIONS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law during the German colonial enterprise in South West
Africa obligated European powers to protect the moral and humanitarian
interests of colonized peoples. These interests included (1) protection of
the indigenous people of Africa from destruction and annihila-
tion, (2) prohibition of the trade in human beings, and (3) preservation of
freedom of religion among Christian denominations. This Part focuses on
the obligation of colonial powers to protect indigenous Africans from an-
nihilation under multilateral treaties, customary international law, and laws
of war.
A. International Treaties
Treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce have shaped the positive
law of nations since the beginning of the nineteenth century. 78 Treaties
have also played an important role in delineating international humanitar-
ian law and elements of fundamental rights, including protections of reli-
gious freedom 79 and prohibitions against trafficking in human beings. For
example, the 1884-1885 Berlin West Africa Conference, which established
guidelines for the European colonization of Africa, included humanitarian
obligations such as the "preservation of the native tribes," the suppression
of slavery and the slave trade, and the protection of religious freedom. 0
Treaties prohibiting trade in human beings provide further evidence that
78. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (3d Eng. ed. Stevens & Sons Ltd.
1889) (1836); see generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825). See GEORGE FRtDERIC DE MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 5
(1802).
79. Two and one-half centuries before the German-Herero War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia
assured freedom of religion for Christians of different denominations in European nations. See FRANZ
VON LISZT, DAS V5LKERRECHT 284 (1907); see also BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 23-24 (discussing
the protection of religious freedom in international law). The 1861 German-Chinese Treaty of
Friendship extended freedom of religion to Christians in China and Russia. See id. The 1878 Berlin
Congress expanded protections for religious freedom in Europe to Christians in Montenegro, Serbia,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. See id. One year later, the Treaty of 1879 secured freedom of religion
for Turkish minorities in territories occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See id Finally, the 1885
Berlin West Africa Convention extended religious freedom to the indigenous people in the African
colonies. See id.
80. General Act of the Berlin Conference, Feb. 26, 1885, art. VI, 165 Consol. T.S. 485, reprinted
in 3 SUPPLEMENT AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (1909), reprinted in R.J. GAVIN & J.A. BETLEY, THE SCRAMBLE
FOR AFRICA: DOCUMENTS ON THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS,
1884ti885, 291 (1973) [hereinafter BERLIN WEST AFRICA CONVENTION]. For a reprint in original
French and German of the Berlin West Africa Convention as drawn from the Reichs-Gesetzblatt No.
23, June 20, 1885, see Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-1885), Protokolle und Generalakte der
Berliner Afrika-Konferenz, 1884-1885 (Obersee-Museum Bremen 1984). The effect of the 1884-1885
Berlin West Africa Conference and the Berlin West Africa Convention upon the Hereros' legal claims
are discussed in detail infra.
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international law recognized and protected indigenous Africans during the
late nineteenth century. These treaties included the 1889 German-Dutch
Agreement, the 1890 German-Belgian Agreement to Criminalize Trade in
Girls, and the 1904 Agreement on Administrative Regulation to Ensure
Effective Protection Against Trade in Girls; which was ratified by fourteen
countries. 81 Additionally, trade in human beings, specifically indigenous
Black Africans, was criminalized by the 1815 Second Paris Peace
Agreement and the 1841 Quintuple Treaty between England, France,
Russia, Austria, and Prussia.82
B. Customary International Law
International law, as applied to the rights and obligations of nations in
the late 1800s and early 1900s, was based in part upon custom.83 Until the
twentieth century, customary international law was the dominant source of
international law. 4 Custom and tacit conventions have shaped the devel-
opment of the positive law of nations since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Sources of customary international law include state practice,
bilateral agreements between states, domestic laws, nonbinding decisions
of international tribunals, and works of jurists and text writers of
81. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 32, 285.
82. See id. at 291-96; see also BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing the criminalization of
the slave trade in international law).
83. Customary international law and treaties are the two most important sources of international
law. See Hans Ballreich, Treaties, Effect on Third States, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 476 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984).
84. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981) ("For centuries, customary law was the
predominant source of international law.").
85. See MARTENS, supra note 78, at 5. Modem human rights laws represent, in part, codifications
of earlier customary international humanitarian law. Under modem international law, the German war
of annihilation against the Hereros would be defined as a crime under Article 6 of the 1945 Charter of
the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), which established three types of crimes under
modem positive international law:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.
See Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last modified Mar. 30, 2005).
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authority. 6 For example, in his 1889 Elements of International Law, con-
temporaneous international legal scholar Henry Wheaton,17  "the
Blackstone of international law, 88 gave primacy to the views of publicists
as evidence of customary international law.89
An analysis of historical sources of customary international law shows
that from 1884 to 1915, European powers had obligations to colonized
peoples both under natural law (humane, ethical, moral, and religious du-
ties) and under positive law (treaties such as the Berlin West Africa
Convention, the Anti-Slavery Convention, and the Hague Convention on
the Laws and Customs of War on Land). These duties and obligations cov-
ered the preservation and welfare of the indigenous peoples. 9° Although the
broader term "genocide" was not yet in use, certain forms of genocide such
as wars of annihilation were already violations of customary international
law at the time of the German-Herero War. In fact, evidence indicates that
wars of annihilation were violations of international law as early as 1878.91
The works of text writers of authority, which show "the approved
usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual conduct,"
provide further evidence that international law had evolved since scholar
Johann Caspar Bluntschli criticized the law's failure to protect indigenous
Africans.92 For example, in his 1907 work Das V6lkerrecht, legal theorist
Franz von Liszt93 analyzed the intentions of European powers that had
entered into obligations to protect indigenous Africans under Article VI of
the Berlin West Africa Convention.94 Von Liszt found that the European
powers intended Article VI to prohibit the annihilation of these peoples.95
Commentary such as this suggests that although prohibitions on wars of
annihilation did not extend protection to indigenous Africans in the early
86. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 12; WHEATON, supra note 78, at 22; see generally The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
87. Henry Wheaton was the most influential and preeminent international legal scholar for over
three decades. See Mortimer Sellers, The Elements ofInternational Law, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 13
(Francesco Parisi et al. eds., 2000).
88. Id. at 11.
89. See WHEATON, supra note 78, at 22.
90. Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80.
91. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 299-300.
92. Id. Bluntschli noted in 1878 that wars of annihilation or extermination were illegal under
international law only when the targeted people and tribes were "capable of life and culture." See
BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 299. However, Bluntschli criticized this lack of protection afforded by
international law based on his reasoning that the humanity of the Africans prohibited the denial of their
human rights. Id. at 299-300.
93. See Liszt, Franz von, *1851, Osterreich-Lexikon (Verlagsgemeinschaft Osterreich-Lexikon),
available at http://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyclop.lIl755000.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005). Von Liszt
(1851-1919), a well-known international legal theorist, was a professor at German universities and the
founder of the German criminal-sociological school of criminal law.
94. Article VI of the Berlin West Africa Convention is discussed in detail infra.
95. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 287.
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1800s, European nations had entered into obligations under international
law to protect these peoples by the end of the nineteenth century.
In 1889, Henry Wheaton wrote that the customary law of nations is
"binding upon those [s]tates... which have given their tacit consent to
it."96 While international law in the late 1800s did not apply to all nations,
it did regulate those which had tacitly consented to it, including European
nations such as Germany. 97 Finally, European nations were bound in their
relations with indigenous peoples, as well as with other European nations,
by international humanitarian law limiting barbarism.98 As a result, some
scholars argue that international law governed the relationship between
Germany and the Herero Nation resulting from their 1885 Treaty of
Friendship and Protection.99
C. Laws of War
In addition to international law, rules reflecting a mixture of custom-
ary and treaty law applied to European nations during times of war.t°°
International law generally prohibited the use of force at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.'' However, under
the laws of war, necessity provided a limited exception to this general pro-
hibition."0 2 Specifically, the use of force against persons in war was re-
stricted to the amount of force necessary to achieve the "just ends of war"
such "as may be necessary to secure the object of hostilities" or defeat the
enemy's resistance.'03
Even during war, the European powers considered certain uses of
force unlawful." For example, loading cannons with nails or pieces of iron
violated the laws of war because it unnecessarily increased the number of
casualties and "wantonly increase[ed] the pain."'0 5 Use of poison in war
96. WHEATON, supra note 78, at 14.
97. See id. at 17.
98. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 283; see also text accompanying note 107, supra.
99. See Hinz, supra note 15, at 8 ("The more appropriate interpretation of the German Herero
relationship around the German Herero war is to see it as a relationship governed by international
law.") (citing SCHACK, supra note 26).
100. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 296.
101. See WHEATON, supra note 78, at 466.
102. See id. at 461, 466.
103. See id at 473; see also VON LsZT, supra note 79, at 333 ("Im allgemeinen darf der
Kriegsfldhrende alle Mittel anwenden, deren Anwendung notwendig ist, urn den Widerstand des
Gegners niederzuwerfen.") ("In general, the warring party is allowed to use all means necessary to
overcome the opponent's resistance.") (author's transl.). For a discussion of the laws of war regarding
the use of force, see BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 35-40.
104. See MARTENS, supra note 78, at 286; see also BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 299 ("Das
V61kerrecht verbindet auch die Kriegsparteien wthrend des Kriegs als Glieder der Menschheit und
beschrankt dieselben in der Anwendung der zulAssigen Gewaltmittel.") ("International law binds the
warring parties during wartime as parts of humanity and limits them in the use of force.") (author's
transl.).
105. MARTENS, supra note 78, at 289.
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had been illegal under international law since the beginning of the seven-
teenth century. °6 Further, the laws of war condemned the killing of
"children, old men, women, and in general all those who cannot carry
arms, or who ought not to.' 10 7 By the second half of the nineteenth century,
European customary international law forbade torture and rape. 108
The laws of war also regulated the treatment of prisoners. Customary
laws requiring captors to spare the lives of prisoners of war date back to
early India and were followed during the Roman Empire and the Middle
Ages. 1"9 By the 1870s, customary laws of war prohibited the killing or
wounding of prisoners of war."' Finally, although departure from the laws
of war was considered permissible at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury if the enemy "set[] the example" or if such departure was an "urgent
necessity,"'' . customary international law barred retaliatory violations of
this kind by the end of the century.' 12
As with much international law, customary laws of war were eventu-
ally codified in a convention. The 1899 Hague Convention, in particular
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (commonly known as Hague II),
codified the laws of war' and was the first convention regulating the
treatment of prisoners of war." 4 This codification stemmed from a "desire
to diminish the evils of war""' 5 and was based on the law of nations, estab-
lished usages, laws of humanity, and public conscience." 6 Although the
provisions of Hague II were binding on its signatories only in the event of
106. Id. at 288 ("It is a violation of the laws of war to poison wells in order to destroy the
enemy."); see also BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 316 ("Das Volkerrecht verwirft den Meuchelmord
eines feindlichen Individuums als unerlaubtes Kriegsmittel." This includes "Meuchelmord durch
verr~terisches Beibringen von Gift.") ("International law condemns the treacherous murder of enemy
individuals as impermissible weapons of war. This includes treacherous murder by use of poison.")
(author's transl.).
107. MARTENS, supra note 78, at 289-90.
108. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2 at 325 ("Alle solche [scheuslisschten Misshandlungen und
Folterqualen, wie die Notzucht an den Weibem] wird von der heutigen Kriegssitte und dem civilisirten
Kriegsrecht als barbarisch untersagt.") ("All such [hideous abuses and tortures, such as the rape of
women], is forbidden as barbaric by the contemporary war morality and the civilized laws of war.")
(author's transl.).
109. See id. at 329.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 287.
112. See id. at 319 ("Die Barberi des Feindes rechtfertigt nicht die eigne Barberi.") ("The
barbarism of the enemy does not justify one's own barbarism.") (author's transl.). Even if retaliatory
violations had been a legal exception to the laws of war at the time of the German-Herero War, these
violations were not justified in the case of the Hereros. See GEORGE LOWTHER STEER, JUDGEMENT ON
GERMAN AFRICA 62 (1939).
113. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, Treaty Series 403, available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/
lawofwar/hague02.htm [hereinafter Hague Convention (II)].
114. Anton SchlOgel, Geneva Red Cross Conventions and Protocols, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (Rudolf Bernhard ed., 1982).
115. Hague Convention (II), supra note 113.
116. Id.
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war between parties to the Convention,1 7 they are nonetheless evidence of
the development of customary international law. Among other provisions,
the Hague II Convention required the humane treatment of prisoners of
war,1 8 restricted the permissible use of force,11 9 required permission for
combatants to surrender, 2° and prohibited the use of poison or killing of
enemies who surrendered. 21
III
THE ANNIHILATION OF THE HERERO NATION AS A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Notwithstanding Germany's legal obligations to the Hereros under
international treaties, customary international law, and laws of war, the
debate continues as to whether the German war of annihilation against the
Hereros was "merely" a moral rather than a legal wrong. To date, scholars
and commentators have articulated four main arguments to support the
contention that the German war of annihilation against the Herero Nation
did not violate contemporaneous international law.'22 First, Germany's war
of annihilation should fall outside the scope of international law because
European powers did not regard indigenous colonial peoples as members
of the "family of nations."'23 Second, because Germany achieved colonial
rule of South West Africa through occupation, the German war of annihila-
tion against the Hereros should not be considered an international con-
flict. 24 Third, contemporaneous customary international law should not
apply to Germany's acts against the Hereros because the Hereros were an
"uncivilized" people.'25 Fourth, the Berlin West Africa Convention should
117. Id.
118. Id. § I, ch. II, art. 4.
119. Id. § 11, ch. I, art. 22.
120. Id.
121. Id. § II, ch. I, art. 23.
122. See Kammerer & Foh, supra note 3.
123. See, e.g., id. at 306.
124. Id. at 308-09.
125. Id. at 315. This argument seems to be weakened by the inclusion of the "laws of humanity" in
the Marten's Clause of the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II, which does not discriminate
between "civilized" and "uncivilized" peoples. See Hague Convention (II), supra note 113. Also, up
until shortly before the German-Herero War, "the Hereros were often portrayed in a positive light, as a
noble warrior race." Stone, supra note 4, at 39. See generally, id. (discussing the connection between
the German's frustration with the progress of their colonial enterprise in Hereroland and the changes in
the German's depictions of the Hereros). Thus, it would seem that later characterizations of the Hereros
as "uncivilized" and therefore not deserving of the protection of international law may be based more
on political expediency than on an accurate description of their status under contemporaneous
international law. There is evidence that the German government may have purposefully created an
atmosphere in which racist sentiments would be intensified. See GEWALD, supra note 17, at 191
(discussing the role of German legislation creating a false shortage of land for German settlers that led
to jingoistic attitudes among settlers and their sympathizers, which contributed to "the creation of a
climate wherein the outbreak of war became inevitable.").
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not be read to confer rights on the indigenous peoples of Africa. 126 All four
arguments overlook the ramifications of the Berlin West Africa
Convention's dispute-settlement clause in the context of the third-party
beneficiary doctrine. 1
27
Modem international law does not apply to the German-Herero War.
Twentieth-century codifications of international humanitarian law, such as
the Nuremburg Charter and the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, were not in force during the
German-Herero War, which lasted from 1904 to 1907. Therefore, any
claim that the Hereros make against Germany must rely on international
law as it stood at the beginning of the twentieth century. This Part exam-
ines the contemporaneous international law at the time of the
German-Herero War in more detail.
A. 1885 Berlin West Africa Convention
The 1885 Berlin West Africa Convention directly establishes a claim
for the Hereros under international law. The Convention was an interna-
tional agreement that divided Africa into spheres of European colonial in-
fluence. It also established European nations' obligations and duties to
indigenous Africans, as well as third-party beneficiary rights for the colo-
nized peoples of Africa.128
Germany signed and ratified the Berlin West Africa Convention in
1885.129 Article VI of the Convention explicitly bans annihilation by
requiring its signatories to protect African peoples. 30 Under Article VI, all
126. See Kimmerer & F6h, supra note 3, at 312. Nonetheless, some scholars do acknowledge that
Article VI of the Convention legally bound Germany to protect the indigenous peoples of Africa.
127. See generally id. The third-party beneficiary doctrine is discussed in further detail infra.
128. Third-party beneficiary rights are discussed infra.
129. See Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80. Other signatories included Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Portugal,
Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.
130. Id. The Convention also confirms the expansion of international humanitarian law in the area
of religious tolerance. WHEATON, supra note 78, at 804. Article VI states that "[f]reedom of conscience
and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than to subjects and to
foreigners." Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80. Participants at the third session of the
Berlin West Africa Conference addressed the wording in Article VI to protect religious freedom. Prince
von Bismarck suggested the following phrasing:
All the Powers exercising the rights of sovereignty or having influence in the said territories
will undertake the obligation to assist in the suppression of slavery, and more especially of
the Slave Trade in negroes, to protect and assist the labours of Missions and all institutions
serving to instruct the natives and to make them understand and appreciate the advantages of
civilization.
Protocol No. 3 to the Berlin West Africa Conference, Nov. 27, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY,
supra note 80, at 147. Sir Edward Malet, supported by Said Pasha, suggested that this wording be
amended to include "the exercise of every religion without distinction of creed" between the words
"labours of the Mission" and "and all institutions." Protocol No. 3 to the Berlin West Africa
Conference, Nov. 27, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 148. For further
discussion of the specific religions and religious freedoms intended to be guaranteed under the Berlin
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powers exercising sovereign rights in Africa bound themselves "to watch
over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement
of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in
suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade."'' The Convention
also contains a dispute-settlement clause. 32
The Protocols from the Berlin West Africa Conference reveal that the
European powers intended to use the Convention's affirmative obligations
to protect indigenous Africans. In November 1884, Prince von Bismarck,
German chancellor and president of the Conference, outlined the intention
of the Conference as "guided by the conviction that all the Governments
invited share the wish to bring the natives of Africa within the pale of
civilization.' 3' At the same meeting, Sir Edward Balwin Malet, British
ambassador and representative at the Conference, expanded on this issue
by reading aloud a declaration stating that commercial interests should not
be the exclusive subject of the deliberations of the Conference. Malet in-
stead urged the Conference's participants to consider the following:
[T]he welfare of the natives should not be neglected[.] I venture to
hope that.., its introduction will confer the advantages of
civilization on the natives, and extinguish such evils as the internal
Slave Trade .... I cannot forget that the natives are not represented
amongst us, and that the decisions of the Conference will,
nevertheless, have an extreme importance for them. The principle
which will command the sympathy and support of Her Majesty's
Government will be... for the equality of treatment of all nations,
and for the well-being of the native races. "I
The recorded comments of other governments represented at the
Conference reflect and expand upon the general intent of Malet's state-
ment. The statements made at the outset of the Conference thus provide
evidence of the European powers' intention to assume obligations under
international law to protect indigenous Africans. Read in light of these in-
tentions, Article VI of the Berlin West Africa Convention creates a duty of
protection under international law that de facto criminalizes the intentional
annihilation of indigenous peoples of Africa.
Statements made in Convention meetings also reveal the delegates'
acceptance of the duty of protection and their intentions to create a model
of European "civilization" for indigenous Africans. Da Serra Gomes, who
West Africa Conference, see Protocol No. 4 to the Berlin West Africa Conference, Dec. 1, 1884,
reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 160-62.
131. Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80.
132. Id. art. 12 (reserving a right to mediation or arbitration of disputes before "serious dissention"
is resolved through the use of force).
133. Protocol No. 1 to the Berlin West Africa Conference, Nov. 15, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN &
BETLEY, supra note 80, at 129.
134. See id., reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 131.
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represented Portugal at the Conference, echoed the sentiments of British
representative Sir Malet at a November 1884 meeting by expressing the
hope "that the natives may profit as much as possible by the advantages of
civilization."
' 135
The specific obligations of the signatories were discussed several
times, suggesting that Convention representatives viewed these obligations
not as an afterthought but as a significant undertaking. For example,
Article VI was discussed in detail at a meeting in December 1884. The re-
sulting Declaration Relative to the Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of
the Congo, its Mouth, and Surrounding Countries (Congo Basin Commerce
Declaration), states:
All the Powers exercising the rights of sovereignty or an influence
in the said territories engage themselves to watch over the
preservation of the native populations and the improvement of the
conditions of existence, both moral and material, and to assist in
suppressing slavery, and more especially the Slave Trade in blacks;
they will protect and assist, without distinction of nationality or
faith, all institutions and undertakings, religious, scientific, or
charitable, created and organized with those objects, or tending to
instruct the natives and to make them understand and appreciate the
advantages of civilization. 36
Documents discussing the content of Article VI further support the
intent of the signatories to protect indigenous African peoples. The Report
on the Congo Basin Commerce Declaration, 37 which examined the intent
of the delegates regarding each article of the Convention, described Article
VI as protecting humanitarian interests. According to the Report, "[t]he
VIth Article regulates various matters, all of which, however, [apply to]
moral interests.""13 Specifically, Article VI addresses three areas of hu-
manitarian international law: (1) protection of indigenous African popula-
tions, (2) elimination of the Slave Trade, and (3) protection of religious
135. Protocol No. 2 to the Berlin West Africa Conference, Nov. 19, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN &
BETLEY, supra note 80, at 135.
136. Declaration Relative to the Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo, its Mouth, and
Surrounding Countries, Annex I to Protocol No. 4 of the Berlin West Africa Conference, Dec. 1, 1884,
reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 167-70.
137. However, it should be noted that "this document is not called upon to play the role of a legal
commentary upon the acts of the [Berlin West Africa] Conference." Protocol No. 5 to the Berlin West
Africa Conference, Dec. 18, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 177 (statement of
Count Kapnist, Russian ambassador to Germany and Russian representative at the Conference).
According to the President of the Berlin West Africa Convention, Prince von Bismarck, the Report of
the Commission was "destined to serve as a guide, but not as a legal commentary." Id.
138. Report Made in the Name of the Commission Charged with Examining the Project of
Declaration Relating to Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo and its Affluents, Annex 1 to
Protocol No. 4 of the Berlin West Africa Conference, Dec. 1, 1884, reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY,
supra note 80, at 172.
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freedom.139 The first element is the most important with regard to the
German war of annihilation against the Hereros. The Report discussed the
first element in detail, stating:
With regard to [native] populations, which, for the most part,
ought, undoubtedly, not to be considered as placed without the pale
of international law, but which in the present state of affairs are
scarcely of themselves able to defend their own interests, the
Conference has been obliged to assume the role of an unofficial
guardian. The necessity of insuring the preservation of the natives,
the duty of assisting them to attain a more elevated political and
social state, the obligation of instructing them and of initiating
them in the advantages of civilization, are unanimously
recognized. 140
The Report also demonstrates that European powers intended Article VI to
embody protections and guarantees for indigenous Africans by declar-
ing: "It is the very future of Africa which is here at stake; no difference of
opinion was or could be manifested in the Commission on this point."
t14 1
The Report concludes by reconfirming that "the moral and material
conditions of existence of the native populations ... form the subject of
guarantees which fulfill the most lofty aim of your labours. 142
The Berlin West Africa Convention created binding international law
protecting African peoples and nations with the express intent of the signa-
tory governments. The Conference representatives were well aware that the
Berlin West Africa Convention would result in the creation of international
law. Indeed, the protocol of the eighth session of the Conference closed
with the following words:
Gentlemen, after having surrounded freedom of commerce and
navigation in the centre of Africa with guarantees, and after having
shown your solicitude for the moral and material welfare of the
populations which inhabit it, you are about to introduce rules into
positive international law which are destined to remove all causes
of disagreement and strife from international relations.143
B. 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention
The 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention strengthened international legal
protections of African nations from annihilation. Also known as the
Brussels Act of 1890, the Anti-Slavery Convention includes language
139. See id., reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 172.
140. Id., reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 172.
141. Id., reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 172.
142. Id., reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 173.
143. Annex I to Protocol No. 8 of the Berlin West Africa Conference, Jan. 31, 1885, reprinted in
GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 250.
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similar to that of the Berlin West Africa Convention.144 Article II of the
Convention states that the Convention's purpose is "to improve the moral
and material conditions of existence of the native races. 145 Further, as part
of the European powers' goal to ensure the survival of indigenous
Africans, Article VIII of the Convention limits the use of certain weap-
ons.146 As these clauses illustrate, by the end of the nineteenth century
European colonial powers were codifying international legal standards on
the treatment of indigenous peoples. In the decade preceding the German-
Herero War, European powers were also taking significant steps to
strengthen protections for indigenous Africans.
In addition to violating the positive laws that were in place prior to the
German-Herero conflict, the German war of annihilation against the
Hereros contravened contemporaneous customary international law.
14 7
Even though Germany's acts of genocide took place during wartime,
actions such as poisoning wells, 48 committing rape,149 killing women and
children,15 and wounding and killing prisoners of war 5 ' violated the per-
missible exceptions to contemporaneous customary international law al-
lowed in wartime.
IV
THE HEREROS' CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
DOCTRINE
Although the Hereros were not signatories to the 1885 Berlin West
Africa Convention and the 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention, these conven-
tions conferred rights on the Hereros through the third-party beneficiary
doctrine. The parties to these international agreements intended to confer a
144. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 287 ("Mit voller Deutlichkeit ist das Bestreben, die
Eingeborenen der europaischen "Schutzgebiete" vor dem Untergang zu schfitzen, in der Kongoakte von
1885 wie in der Antisklaveriakte von 1890 zum Ausdruck gebracht.") ("The endeavor to protect the
indigenous peoples from destruction is clearly expressed in the Berlin Africa Convention from 1885
and the Anti-Slavery Convention of 1890.") (author's transl.). Eighteen countries signed the Anti-
Slavery Convention, including Germany. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 293-94.
145. Declaration of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886, T.S.
No. 383, 173 Parry's T.S. 293 (1968), reprinted in HENRY WELLINGTON WACK, THE STORY OF THE
CONGO FREE STATE 552 (1905), http://www.zum.de/whkmla/documents/wack/wackapplO.html
[hereinafter General Act of the Brussels Conference]; see also MAX FLIESCHMANN,
V6LKERRECHTSQUELLEN IM AUSWAHL 226 (1905); VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 288.
146. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 288 ("Art. VIlIff... dient der 'Erhaltung der afrikanischen
V6lkerschaften, deren Fortbestehen zu sichem der ausdrtickliche Wille der Michte ist."' ("Art.
VIIIff... serves the 'preservation of the African peoples, the securing of whose continued existence is
the express intent of the powers."') (author's transl.)) (quoting the Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 1892, at
605)).
147. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 283, 299-300; WHEATON, supra note 78, at 14.
148. See MARTENS, supra note 78, at 288.
149. See BLUNTSCHLI, supra note 2, at 325.
150. See id. at 289-90.
151. See id. at 329.
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distinct set of protections upon indigenous Africans. In other words, the
parties expected peoples such as the Hereros to benefit from these agree-
ments. Further, the protocols of the Berlin West Africa Conference lend
substantial support to this interpretation. As third-party beneficiaries of
these instruments, the Hereros had the right to protection from harm by
colonial powers. Because Germany failed to provide these protections and
instead waged a war of annihilation against indigenous Africans, the
Hereros are entitled to a cause of action under international law.
In sum, if an analysis of international law at the beginning of the
twentieth century establishes that (1) actions committed by the German
colonial administration violated customary or treaty law, and (2) the
Berlin West Africa Convention and the Anti-Slavery Convention conferred
third-party beneficiary rights of protection on the Herero Nation and its
people, then the Hereros have a cause of action to claim injuries and repa-
rations for the atrocities Germany committed against them. This Part ana-
lyzes the Hereros' third-party beneficiary rights in greater depth.
A. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine Under International Law
The third-party beneficiary doctrine is recognized in international as
well as domestic law.'52 In international law, this doctrine applies to
treaties and other international agreements.'53 A third party is "a subject of
international law [such as a state] which has not subscribed to the
agreement." '154 Third parties are usually not affected by agreements to
which they are not a party.'55 The basic rule, known by the phrase pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosuntis, states that an international agreement or
treaty "does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without
its consent."'56
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Under the 1965
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
"[a]n international agreement may create a right in favor of a state not a
party to it if the agreement manifests the intention of the parties that it shall
152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 324(1) (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. The scope of the third-party beneficiary doctrine has become more
limited under modem international law. The principles governing third-party beneficiary rights had
emerged by the early eighteenth century. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1360-61 (1992).
153. See generally Hans Ballreich, Treaties, Effect on Third States, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 945-49 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) (discussing the effect of treaties on third
parties under international law).
154. Id. at 945.
155. See id.
156. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 34; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 132, §
324(1).
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have this effect. 15 7 This statement of the third-party beneficiary doctrine
explicitly states that the intentions of the contracting parties could create
positive rights for non-parties.1 58 The third-party beneficiary doctrine is
also addressed in international case law. For example, in Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, the Permanent Court of International
Justice found that a declaration signed by France and other powers con-
ferred rights upon Switzerland to French territory even though Switzerland
was not a party to the declaration.'59
Under international and domestic law as delineated by the Free Zones
case, the Restatement (Second), and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, the intent of the parties to the contract or treaty is controlling. 6 '
The existence of third-party beneficiary rights and intent must be estab-
lished on a case-by-case basis. 6 ' Intent of the parties may be established
using "travaux preparatoires, diplomatic correspondence, and voting on
pertinent proposals and resolutions."' 62
International law provides that "[a] right arises for a third State from a
provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to ac-
cord that right ... to the third State... and the third State assents
thereto."'63 The assent of the third party "shall be presumed so long as the
contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides."'64 Once
third-party beneficiary rights have been created, contracting states may not
revoke or modify them without the consent of the third party.'65
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 139(1)
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
158. The Restatement (Second)'s formulation is relevant because it is more likely to reflect the
understanding of the doctrine as it stood at the beginning of the twentieth century than the Restatement
(Third), which has narrowed the third-party doctrine under modem international law. Although the
Vienna Convention of 1969 officially codified the legal standard for revoking or modifying third-party
beneficiary rights, it also reined in its scope.
159. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 46, 147-48 (June 7) [hereinafter Free Zones Case]. "It cannot be lightly presumed that stipulations
favourable to a third [sjtate have been adopted with the object of creating an actual right in its favour.
There is however nothing to prevent the will of sovereign States from having this object and this
effect." Id. at 147.
160. Luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 545
(1983).
161. Free Zones Case, supra note 159, at 147-48.
162. Lee, supra note 160, at 547.
163. Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 36, 1; George D. Haimbaugh, Impact of the
Reagan Administration on the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151, 188-89 (1989). See also
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 156, § 324(3).
164. Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 36, 1. See also RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note
156, § 324 cmt. d ("[C]onsent of third parties to the creation of a right in rem in their favor seems
unnecessary."); Ballreich, supra note 153, at 945.
165. See Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 37, 2 ("When a right has arisen for a third
State in conformity with article 36, the right may not be revoked or modified by the parties if it is
established that the right was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the
consent of the third State."); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 156, § 324, cmt. d ("[R]ights in rem
should be no more subject to termination or modification without consent than rights under [§ 324].").
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the three core elements that de-
fined a state were population, territory, and government.166 The essential
factor underlying a state's government is that it is capable of acting inde-
pendently of foreign governments. 167 The state has jurisdiction over its own
people and territory. 168 Foreign governments require the consent of the
state to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals in its territory. 6 9 However,
a state may partially limit its jurisdiction by concluding treaties with other
states.170 The test for whether a state has remained a sovereign entity in
spite of limitations through treaties is whether it remains independent from
direct orders by other states.'
States have certain rights under international law. States are entities
that have exclusive jurisdiction over their territory and nationals. 72 One of
the rights of states under international law is the competence to conclude
treaties. 73 In other words, states have "the legal possibility of conferring
rights and duties on other subjects of international law."' 174 Such rights and
duties could include jurisdiction over its nationals in the signatory nation's
territory and the obligation to provide military aid.
175
The terms "state" and "nation" are often used synonymously in inter-
national law. 176 The definition of a state population is more expansive and
is not limited by criteria such as ethnic, cultural, religious, or racial com-
monalities that may play a role in defining a nation. 77 The powers of a
state within its territory may be more expansive than is true for some na-
tions because states possess sovereignty within their territory. 178 Thus, the
key difference between states and nations is the element of government.'79
Where nations have the added element of a government, they should be
treated as states under the third-party beneficiary doctrine.
166. See Karl Doehring, State, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 601 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 2000) (discussing Georg Jellinek's doctrine of the three elements).
167. See id. at 603.
168. See id. at 602.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id at 601.
175. See id. at 603.
176. See Karl Josef Partsch, Nations, Peoples, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 512 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997) ("The term 'nation' is used in modem international law nearly
generally as equivalent to its primary subject, namely the State."). This is also evidenced in the names
of institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Historically, international law was
also referred to as the law of nations.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Partsch, supra note 176, at 512; Doehring, supra note 166, at 601.
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B. The Herero Nation as a Third-Party Beneficiary
Given the socio-political history and structure of the Herero Nation,
its exercise of the powers of a state, and its de facto recognition by other
states, the distinction between the Hereros' status as a "nation" rather than
a "state" is nominal rather than substantive.18° The Herero Nation falls
within the scope of the third-party beneficiary doctrine because it: (1) had
the characteristics of a sovereign state and (2) was the intended benefici-
ary of the 1885 Berlin West Africa Convention.
First, the Hereros' socio-political structure was that of a state. The
Hereros had a population, a territory, and a government, which are the core
elements of a state under contemporaneous international law.18' The
Hereros, a Bantu speaking people, 8 2 formed a distinct population group
comprising the Mbandjeru and the Tjimba' 83 At the turn of the twentieth
century, the Hereros constituted both a people and a nation. The Herero
Nation is analogous to other recognized nations of indigenous peoples such
as the Native American Nations of North America. Nations are distinct
from "peoples" because the term "nation" denotes a people who occupy a
specific territory.'84 Nations can be "understood as cultural groups with a
common language, a common cultural identity[,] and common
traditions .... "185 In the late 1800s, Herero society became "strongly
centralized and centred upon a number of specific urban centres"'86 and
"specific geographical areas."' 18 7 By the nineteenth century "an influential
aristocracy" was assuming control of the Herero Nation, and "the contours
of a class society had become clearly visible."' 88 Before 1870, "the
Hereros' socio-political organization was a complex system
of ... groupings."' 89 The approximately 80,000 Hereros in Hereroland
(now Central Namibia) were governed by four principal Herero chiefs9 °
and a "new form of centralized Herero polity" was created and
maintained.'' Further, "[p]roperty rights.., were protected by a well
180. See Partsch, supra note 176, at 512.
181. See Doehring, supra note 166, at 601.
182. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 17.
183. Id. (citation omitted).
184. See Partsch, supra note 176.
185. Id. at 511.
186. GEWALD, supra note 17, at 8.
187. Id. at28.
188. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 17-18.
189. BRIDGMAN, supra note 32, at 18.
190. See HPRC I, supra note 22, 30, Harring, supra note 4, at 401, GEWALD, supra note70, at 27
(depicting areas under the control of the four principal Herero chiefs at the advent of German
colonislism in 1884 in Map 1.2); BLEY, supra note 15, at xxx (depicting South West Africa before the
Hereto Revolt (1902) including the territorial boundaries of the Herero Nation in Map 2).
191. GEWALD, supra note17, at 28.
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organized judicial system.' 1 92 Scholars describe this stage of the Herero
socio-political development as the transition to an early type of pastoral
feudalism. 1
9 3
The German government de facto recognized the Herero people as a
nation or state by referring to them as a nation in official government
documents and entering into bilateral treaties with them. For example,
Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha, who later orchestrated the German
war of annihilation against the Hereros, repeatedly described them as a na-
tion in an official 1904 report to the chief of the army general staff. First,
he stated that "[a]s [he] saw it, the [Herero N]ation must be destroyed as
such."'9 4 He also wrote that he "deem[ed] it wiser for the entire [Herero]
nation to perish."' 95 Von Trotha also referred to the Herero Nation in his
correspondence with Governor Leutwein at the beginning of the war, writ-
ing that the "[Herero N]ation must vanish from the face of the earth."' 96
The Herero Nation also exercised the powers of a state by entering
into treaties with African'97 and European nations. The bilateral protection
treaties with the German government evidence the Herero Nation's
exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and nationals, and they provide
proof of its competence to conclude treaties conferring rights and duties
upon other subjects of international law.'98 The treaties gave German na-
tionals the right to trade in the Hereros' territory and gave the German
government jurisdiction over German nationals in Hereroland."' The trea-
ties also created an obligation for the Germans to provide military support
to the Hereros.20 ' Although the treaties limited the Herero Nation's juris-
diction over German nationals, the Hereros remained an independent sov-
ereign entity because the treaties did not make the Herero government
subject to direct orders by the German government. 201 Germany did not
exercise sovereign control over South West Africa as a colony until after
the end of the German-Herero War in 1907.202
192. BRIDGMAN, supra note 32, at 18 (quoting HEINRICH LOTH, DIE CHRISTLICHE MISSION IN
SiDWESTAFRIKA. ZUR DESTRUKTIVEN ROLLE DER RHEINISCHEN MISSIONSGESELLSCHAFT BEIM
PROZESS DER STAATSBILDUNG IN SODWESTAFRIKA (1842 BIS 1893) 23-24 (1963)).
193. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 18 (paraphrasing LOTH, supra note 192, at 8).
194. DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 160-61 (quoting Report from Lothar von Trotha to the army
chief of staff (Oct. 4, 1904) (on file with German Imp. Col. Off. )).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 161 (quoting Letter from von Trotha to Leutwein, supra note 48).
197. BRIDGMAN, supra note 32, at 20 ("The Hereros... regulated their affairs with other tribes on
the basis of treaties.").
198. See DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing the scope of the treaties).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Doehring, supra note 166, at 603; DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 27.
202. See DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 7.
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The German government's conclusion of bilateral treaties2 °3 with the
Herero Nation is proof of their recognition of the Herero Nation as a sub-
ject of international law204 with the "general competence to conclude trea-
ties. 20 5 These acts implicitly affirm that the Hereros were within the ambit
of international law and that they possessed rights normally reserved for
states under international law.206 In short, although contemporaneous
documents may have used the term "nation" to describe the Hereros' socio-
political structure, in practice they exercised rights accorded only to states.
In addition, other states interacted with them in a manner that confirmed
their valid exercise of these rights.
Second, the creation of third-party beneficiary rights for indigenous
African peoples and nations was an intended result of the Berlin West
Africa Convention2 7 and the Anti-Slavery Convention.2 8 The plain lan-
guage of both of these international agreements requires "the preservation
of the native populations. 2 9 This language shows an intent to protect in-
digenous Africans not only as individuals but also as distinct socio-
political groups. 210 The protocols from the Berlin West Africa Conference
provide further evidence of the European powers' intent regarding the
Hereros' rights under the Convention. As previously established in this
Comment, the protocols contain evidence of an intent to preserve the con-
tinued existence of indigenous Africans, among them the Herero
Nation. Because the intent of the parties to a contract or treaty is control-
ling,211 the protocols support the provision of a third-party beneficiary right
to the Hereros for protection from annihilation.
Under the Berlin West Africa Convention, the signatories intended to
"bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes. 21 2
Contemporaneous commentators wrote that Article VI of the Convention
was intended to create an obligation for the signatories to protect indige-
nous African peoples and to protect them from annihilation.213 Further,
these obligations were framed in the form and language of guarantees,
203. BLEY, supra note 4, at 6.
204. See Doehring, supra note 166, at 601; Ballreich, supra note 153, at 945.
205. See Doehring, supra note 166, at 601.
206. See id
207. See Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80, art. Vt.
208. See General Act of the Brussels Conference, supra note 145, art. II.
209. Declaration Relative to the Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo, its Mouth, and
Surrounding Countries, reprinted in GAVIN & BETLEY, supra note 80, at 167-70. See also VON LISZT,
supra note 79, at 287.
210. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 157, § 139(1). Under modem international law
"[pirotective norms in international humanitarian law entitle even non-government claimants as much
as the language directly reflects rights and interests of individuals." See Hinz, supra note 15, at 10
(citing KNUT IPSEN, VOLKERRECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH 1071 (4th ed. 1999)).
211. See Lee, supra note 160, at 545.
212. Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80.
213. See VON LISZT, supra note 79, at 287.
11832005]
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1183 2005
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
supporting the interpretation that these documents provide third-party
beneficiary rights.
14
The Herero Nation was a third party to the 1885 Berlin West Africa
Convention215 and the 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention.216 The Hereros were
subjects of international law as discussed above and were not signatories.217
Since the Hereros were not in attendance at the conferences and did not
sign the conventions, they arguably did not consent to the creation of rights
for them. However, because the Hereros did not affirmatively oppose the
conferral of third-party beneficiary status, their consent should be pre-
sumed.218 Further, once the conventions went into effect, the signatory na-
tions could not have revoked or modified the Hereros' right to protection
from annihilation without the Hereros' consent.21 9 Thus, the Hereros have a
cause of action based upon the third-party beneficiary rights conferred on
them through the Berlin West Africa Convention and the 1890
Anti-Slavery Convention.
V
THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HEREROS' CAUSE OF
ACTION
The final Part of this Comment departs from the previous analysis of
the various laws and doctrines that apply to the German-Herero War and
examines the implications of the Hereros' claim as a whole. First, this Part
addresses the political implications of the Hereros' efforts because states
often see reparations as a "political rather than a legal issue."20 Second,
this Part addresses the legal implications of the Hereros' claim because
although the Hereros' success in this area has been somewhat limited to
date, the ultimate impact of their claim may depend upon the application of
contemporaneous international law. In addition, the Hereros' success could
have wide-reaching legal implications for other victims of colonial geno-
cide.
214. Report Made in the Name of the Commission Charged with Examining the Project of
Declaration Relating to Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo and its Affluents, supra note
138, at 173.
215. See Berlin West Africa Convention, supra note 80, art. VI.
216. See General Act of the Brussels Conference, supra note 145, art. II.
217. See Ballreich, supra note 153, at 945.
218. See Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 36, 1. See also RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 156, § 324(3).
219. See supra note 142.
220. Sarkin, supra note 69, at 432. See also Harring, supra note 4, at 417 ("Reparations claims are
never heard outside of their political context, and the Herero people will have to bring political pressure
on modem Germany to rethink their responsibility for their actions in the Herero War.").
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A. Political Implications
The Hereros' efforts to achieve a political or negotiated solution to
remedy the harms the nation suffered during the German-Herero War have
had only limited success. For several years, the Hereros attempted to ex-
tract an apology from the Federal Republic of Germany.22 1 Some of the
reasons given by the German government for their resistance to a formal
apology included (1) too much time has passed,222 (2) international law
did not protect civilian populations at the time of the war, and (3) German
foreign aid to Namibia obviates the need for other forms of compensa-
tion.223 However, in 2004 the Hereros finally received a formal apology for
the mass killings perpetrated by the German colonial administration.224 In
most cases, including that of the Hereros, apologies and development aid
cannot fully compensate wrongs committed by colonial powers against
indigenous peoples. As of early 2005, the Hereros had not received finan-
cial reparations for the 1904-1907 genocide.
The Hereros' need for an avenue of redress becomes even more sig-
nificant in light of the Namibian government's failure to support the
Hereros' reparations claims.225 Since Namibia is the largest recipient of
German foreign aid 226 and the Hereros are an ethnic minority 227 with lim-
ited political power, it is unlikely that domestic or foreign political pressure
will force the Namibian government to support the Hereros' claims. In ad-
dition, the Hereros' "claim is not justiciable in Namibian courts. 2
Recognizing the Hereros' right to bring a claim as a people and a former
nation allows them to seek reparations under international law without hav-
ing to rely on the Namibian national government.
Efforts by the Hereros to raise awareness of their claims have at-
tracted both local and international press. An expanding number of muse-
ums and exhibits include information about the German war of annihilation
221. See Hinz, supra note 15, at 6.
222. Ngunjiri, supra note 14. Some land restitution claims by Native American nations have not
been limited in the United States and Canada, which seems to undermine passage of time or statute of
limitations arguments. See Harring, supra note 4, at 409 (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (a claim dating from 1795 that is still being litigated)).
223. See Sarkin, supra note 69, at 454 (citation omitted); Harring, supra note 4, at 406 (citation
omitted); Kutecue, supra note 14.
224. See German Parliament, supra note 7 ("The military campaign against the African peoples in
South West Africa from 1904, and in particular the victims of the Herero and Nama population are
today in the centre of this commemoration. The German Parliament extends its deeply-felt regrets and
its sorrow to the suppressed African peoples."); Harring, supra note 4, at 395 (stating that the Namibian
government's position is that "all Namibian tribes were victimized by colonial exploitation, and
therefore, no group in particular should be singled out to receive reparation payments") (citation
omitted).
225. See Sarkin, supra note 69, at 454; Ngunjiri, supra note 14.
226. See Harring, supra note 4, at 393 (citation omitted).
227. See Centeral Intelligence Agency, supra note 6.
228. Harring, supra note 4, at 410.
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against the Hereros.229 In addition, the Hereros brought some political pres-
sure to bear on the German government by publicizing their claims at the
U.N. World Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa.23° Increasing
awareness of the Hereros' claims outside of Namibia and Germany may
have contributed to the German government's formal apology in 2004.
However, the apology recognized only moral wrongs, not legal obligations.
As a result, the Hereros' legal claims continue to be the most likely avenue
through which they can obtain financial compensation.
B. Legal Implications
The Hereros' case is of particular importance because it is
"[p]robably one of the first cases based on human rights abuses during
colonialism...."231 In February 2003 the Herero People's Reparations
Corporation filed a complaint against Germany in the District Court of the
District of Columbia, which is the equivalent of a state court in
Washington, D.C.232 Germany cannot be brought into court in the United
States without its consent.233 Since Germany refused to accept service of
process, the Hereros voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice.234
Dismissal of the case without prejudice allows the Hereros to revive their
claim at a later date, perhaps when the claim is more politically viable.
Accordingly, the Hereros will refile once service of process issues are re-
solved.235 Political pressure by the U.S. government will likely be neces-
sary to convince Germany to accept jurisdiction and service of process. So
far, the U.S. government has not expressed a willingness to pressure the
German government in this case.236 It is unclear whether issues of race or
the current debate on reparations in the United States factors into the U.S.
government's decision not to intervene.
In addition to their claim against Germany, the Hereros are currently
involved in a case against two large corporations, Deutsche Bank and
229. See supra note 16.
230. See Anthony J. Sebok, Slavery, Reparations, and Potential Legal Liability: The Hidden Legal
Issue Behind [t]he U.N. Racism Conference, Sept. 10, 2001, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
sebok/20010901 .html.
231. Sarkin, supra note 69, at 452.
232. Complaint, Herero People's Reparations Corp. v. Federal Republic of Germany (D.D.C. filed
Feb. 2003) (on file with author) (alleging violations of international law, crimes against humanity,
genocide, slavery, and forced labor).
233. See Argentine Republic v. Amarada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
234. Other jurisdictional and forum issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
235. Telephone Interview with Philip M. Musolino, Counsel for Plaintiffs, Musolino & Dessel
(Oct. 23, 2003).
236. See Letter from Linda Jacobson, assistant legal adviser, Office of Diplomatic Law and
Litigation, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip M. Musolino, Musolino & Dessel, Counsel for the Hereros
(Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with author).
1186 [Vol. 93:1155
HeinOnline -- 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1186 2005
REDRESSING COLONIAL GENOCIDE
Woermann Line (now known as Deutsche-Afrika Linien Gmbh & Co.). 23 7
The Hereros allege that the two corporations committed violations of inter-
national law, crimes against humanity, forced labor, genocide, and slav-
ery.238 This case is still pending.239 Deutsche Bank and Woermann Line
have filed motions to dismiss, which have been opposed by the Hereros.24 °
As previously argued, the Hereros have cognizable claims based in
several forms of international law, and recognition of these claims is essen-
tial to providing adequate redress. This Comment has established that the
German colonial administration's actions violated contemporaneous inter-
national law as well as the third-party beneficiary rights conferred on the
Hereros by international agreements. Further, the German colonial admini-
stration's war of annihilation against the Hereros violated customary inter-
national law. Poisoning wells, killing women and children, and killing and
wounding prisoners of war were illegal under the laws of war. The war also
violated applicable treaty law prohibiting the annihilation of African peo-
ples, including clauses in the Berlin West African Convention and the 1890
Anti-Slavery Convention that obligated colonial powers to protect indige-
nous Africans.
A settlement agreement 24' with the German government or eventual
success in U.S. or international courts could have precedential value for
claims brought by other groups to redress similar wrongs committed under
237. See Email from Philip M. Musolino, Counsel for the Hereros, Musolino & Dessel, to Rachel
J. Anderson, California Law Review (Apr. 17, 2005, 21:32:29 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Email from Philip M. Musolino]; Herero People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG (S.D.N.Y.
filed Feb. 13, 2003) (alleging violations of international law, crimes against humanity, genocide,
slavery, and forced labor and seeking relief under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350). This
case is a companion case to one filed by the Hereros in Washington, D.C., at the same time as the case
against the Federal Republic of Germany. See Email from Philip M. Musolino, supra. The D.C. District
Court case, which was affirmed on appeal, was dismissed against Woermann Line for lack of personal
jurisdiction and against Deutsche Bank for failure to present a valid cause of action since "the District
Court of Columbia Circuit does not appear to recognize a private right of action for violations of
international law." Herero People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, Civ. No. 01-1868, slip
op. (D.C.C. June 31, 2003); Hereto People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 370 F.3d 1192
(2004), cert denied 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004) (Nov. 15, 2004) (holding that (1) federal claims were
present, (2) plaintiffs' claims were not too insubstantial and frivolous to support federal jurisdiction,
and (3) the doctrine of universal jurisdiction could not supply basis for exercise of personal
jurisdiction). However, the Hereros have filed a case in New Jersey District Court, where Woermann
Line has agreed to submit to jurisdiction. Email from Philip M. Musolino, supra.
238. Complaint, Herero People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG (S.D.N.Y filed Feb. 13,
2003) (on file with author).
239. Email from Philip M. Musolino, supra note 237.
240. Id.
241. See The Herero [Issue [Will [N]ot [SItop, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2004),
http ://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area--/breakingnews/breakingnews africa&articleid= 134579
("[A] German law professor, Manfred Hinz, has proposed the establishment of a reconciliation
commission comprising leaders of the Herero people and Germany 'to work out an appropriate form of
apology and possible reparation, and hopefully, an out-of-court settlement."').
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colonial rule. The Damara2 42 could sue the German government for their
slaughter during the German-Herero War. The Maji-Maji could sue for
their brutal repression in former German East Africa (now Tanzania) from
1905 to 1908.243 The Congolese could sue Belgium for perpetrating geno-
cide in Congo under King Leopold's reign.2 ' The Bunyoro245 could sue the
United Kingdom for war crimes in Uganda during the 1890s.
An agreement or successful case in court for the Hereros could help to
dissolve the line traditionally drawn between moral and legal wrongs,
whereby perpetrator nations can admit to the former while avoiding the
legal and financial consequences of the latter. Recognizing a claim for the
Hereros under any of the legal theories discussed in this Comment would
likely open the door to other claims by similarly situated groups. For ex-
ample, as the Hereros' quest for reparations drew increasing attention,
other groups such as the Damara2 46 began to seek similar recognition for
their own claims.2 47 Finally, recognition of the Hereros' claim could bar
Germany and other former colonial powers from shirking legal responsibil-
ity for acts of genocide committed by their colonial administrations. In par-
ticular, these governments would be precluded from arguing that
indigenous peoples who were harmed before the 1948 Genocide
Convention had no legal protections.
CONCLUSION
The German colonial enterprise in Hereroland lasted thirty-five years.
In 1904, twenty years after Germany began pursuing its colonial enterprise,
the Herero Nation initiated an armed resistance against the colonial ad-
ministration. In the war that followed, Germany annihilated 80% of the
Herero population. The German Imperial Colonial Office preserved multi-
tudinous evidence, including primary documents ranging from Lothar von
Trotha's infamous Extermination Order to correspondence between
German officials, bearing witness to the intent of the German government.
242. One third of the Berg Damara were killed during the German colonial administration's
attempted annihilation of the Herero as a result of "the German troops[' inability] to tell them from the
Herero." DRECHSLER, supra note 4, at 214. See also Paulette Reed-Anderson, Chronologie zur
Deutschen Kolonialgeschichte, at http://www.cybernomads.netcn/home.cfm?p=1033&CFID =
9414885&CFTOKEN=22256721 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
243. The German suppression of the rebellion led to the "murder of approx[imately] 200,000 in
the region." PAULETTE REED-ANDERSON, REWRITING THE FOOTNOTES: BERLIN AND THE AFRICAN
DIASPORA 18 (2000). A bibliography of sources from direct observers of the Maji-Maji Rebellion is
available at the Maji Maji Bibliography Project, at http://www.mhudi.de/maji/Bibliography.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2005).
244. See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998) (containing an extensive bibliography).
245. See Sarkin, supra note 69, at 452.
246. See supra note 242.
247. See Christof Maletsky, Damaras Demand German Answers, THE NAMIBIAN, Jan. 26, 2005,
http://www.namibian.com.na/2005/January/national/05901 ED968.html.
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Undoubtedly, the 1904-07 German-Herero War was waged to annihilate
the Hereros.
At the time of the German-Herero conflict, wars of annihilation were
prohibited under contemporaneous international law. The 1899 Hague
Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land provides evidence
of developments in the customary international laws of war at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. It also supports the premise that natural law,
positive law, and customary law limited the use of force, and it confirms
that wartime atrocities were unacceptable from 1899 onward.
Beyond the protections afforded by customs limiting the use of force
in war, international agreements conferred humanitarian rights upon the
Hereros. In turn, European powers had obligations, both under the Berlin
West African Convention and under the 1890 Anti-Slavery Convention, to
protect indigenous Africans from annihilation and to preserve their well-
being. Only the Hereros could revoke or modify these third-party benefici-
ary rights, which were violated by Germany's war of annihilation. Justice
requires that the Hereros, as victims of Germany's refusal to observe inter-
national law, should have rights of redress similar to those of genocide vic-
tims after 1948. Establishing a right to redress for the Hereros also has
broader implications because it sets a precedent for reparations for colonial
genocide. This precedent is important because reparations serve multiple
functions, which include (1) giving victims and their descendents an op-
portunity to "cope with the financial deprivation that they have
suffered, 24 8 (2) providing "an official recognition of the past, 249
and (3) "deterring future perpetrators from committing similar violations
in the future."25 The implications of recognizing the Hereros' claim would
sweep beyond the borders of Namibia, providing a voice for the silenced
colonized masses annihilated throughout Africa and the world. To help
ensure that human rights are respected in the future, international law must
acknowledge this voice, even if individual governments refuse to do so.
248. Sarkin, supra note 69, at 429. As recently as 1998 hundreds of Hereros were living under
poor conditions in a refugee camp at Gam, 600 kilometers northeast of Windhoek. See Harring, supra
note 4, at 401 (citing Christof Maletsky, Returned Hereros "Dumped" Says Report, MAIL &
GUARDIAN ONLINE, Mar. 23, 1998, at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/98mar2/23mar-herero.html). The
German government paid several million marks beginning in 1904 to compensate white settlers in
South West Africa for their property losses. Deutschen Kolonialgesellschafi, Rickblick auf die
Entwicklung Deutsch-Siidwestafrikas im Jahre 1904, in DEUTSCHER KOLONIAL-ATLAS MIT JAHRBUCH
1905, at 12-13 (1905), http://www.zum.de/psm/imperialismus/kolonialatlas05/atlas001 .php.
249. Sarkin, supra note 69, at 430. See also Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, Racism,
Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory About Group Deprivations, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
133,217 (2004) ("In the case of genocide or mass murder, after-the-fact accounting and justice may not
help those who have been killed. However, those who survive should have a right to rehabilitation and
either public or private compensation.").
250. Id.
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